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Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The
Relationship Between the Tort
System and No-Fault
Compensation (With an
Emphasis on Workers' Compensation)
Jean C. Lovet
Dissatisfaction with the tort system's fault-based method of com-
pensating for personal injuries has led to the enactment of workers' com-
pensation legislation by every jurisdiction in the United States.1 It has
also prompted New Zealand to adopt a comprehensive no-fault plan for
any type of personal injury caused by accident, whether sustained on the
job or elsewhere.2 These no-fault plans adopted by the United States and
New Zealand have several common features: compensation may be
obtained without proof of fault, no-fault benefits are lower in amount
than the damages recoverable at common law, and no-fault compensa-
tion is often a complete substitute for tort recovery.
When no-fault legislation was originally enacted in the United States
and New Zealand, the focus was on providing adequate compensation for
t Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Wisconsin. This Article is based in part on research undertaken while I was a Ful-
bright-Hays Senior Scholar in residence at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, in 1978.
The research was updated in 1982, when I returned to Wellington under a Research Development
Award from the University of California, Davis. I am grateful to my colleague, Alan Brownstein,
for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also indebted to my research assist-
ants Lisa Tillman, Benna Troup, and Connie Zanglis.
1. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1984); Epstein, The
Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775
(1982); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952).
Workers' compensation legislation is a no-fault plan that compensates for employment-related death
or injury. For a discussion of workers' compensation legislation in other countries, see Fleming,
Tort Liabilityfor Work Injury in 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 9-1
to 9-46 (1975).
2. Accident Compensation Act of 1972, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409, amended by Accident Com-
pensation Act of 1982, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1554. See generally M. BERKOWrrz, THE ECONOMICS OF
WORK ACCIDENTS IN NEW ZEALAND (1979); A. BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEW ZEA-
LAND (1978); T. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND
SCHEME (1980); G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979); Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Com-
pensation Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 781 (1981).
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negligently inflicted physical injury.3 Legislative bodies did not consider
whether no-fault plans should cover claims for pure nonphysical harm,
and the plans were silent on the subject.4 As a result, when claimants
subject to such no-fault legislation bring tort actions for pure nonphysical
harm, the courts have two basic options. First, the judiciary may con-
strue a no-fault plan as implicitly covering claims for nonphyical harm.
That option would bar tort actions for such harm, even though the no-
fault plan may not adequately compensate for nonphysical injuries. Sec-
ond, the judiciary may construe a no-fault plan as explicitly covering
only claims for physical injury. This would permit the victim of a non-
physical injury to pursue a common law tort action outside the frame-
work of the no-fault plan.
In recent years, an increasing volume of litigation has raised the
question of whether no-fault legislation should be construed to cover
pure nonphysical harm.' A review of the current case law indicates that
the judiciary generally prefers the tort forum for dignitary harms, such as
false imprisonment,6 defamation,7 civil rights violations,' invasions of
privacy,9 and retaliatory discharge. 10 The courts are more evenly split
* with respect to actions for emotional distress, such as the intentional
infliction of emotional distress and the bad-faith refusal to pay a workers'
compensation claim." Some courts hold that no-fault legislation pro-
vides the exclusive remedy, even though the benefits do not adequately
compensate for general emotional distress. 2 Others allow recovery in
tort in order to protect fully the plaintiff who has suffered general emo-
tional distress.13 In response to this recent litigation, a few legislatures
have amended their no-fault statutes to explicitly include or exclude coy-
3. G. PALMER, supra note 2, at 23-32, 214-43; Larson, supra note 1, at 209-11.
4. See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.30 (1983). By contrast, the drafters of no-
fault legislation did consider the question of whether to compensate for the pain and suffering or
dignitary harm resulting from negligently inflicted physical injuries. In the United States, compensa-
tion for such nonphysical harm associated with physical injury is generally denied by workers' com-
pensation legislation. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 1-2 (1984). In New Zealand, a lump
sum benefit of up to $10,000 is available for such nonphysical harm as pain and suffering and loss of
amenities. Accident Compensation Act of 1982 § 79, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552. This Article does
not consider the question of whether persons other than the employee should be able to bring tort
actions against the employer for pure nonphysical harm caused by the employee's death or injury
(e.g., actions for loss of consortium, wrongful death, or for the infliction of emotion distress on a
bystander).
5. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § § 68.30-.36 (1983).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 174-91.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 192-211.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 212-53.
9. Id
10. Annot., 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 254-302.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 261-63, 285-89.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 266-70, 290-300.
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erage of claims for certain types of nonphysical harm, but such legisla-
tion is still relatively rare. la
The problem with the current case law is that the courts have not
formulated any consistent theory of tort recovery. Sometimes they per-
mit the claimant to pursue both no-fault benefits and tort damages; some-
times they permit recovery of either no-fault benefits or tort damages.
Recent amendments to workers' compensation plans have compounded
the problem by expanding no-fault coverage to encompass occupational
diseases and mental disabilities.15 Unfortunately, these modifications
were enacted without consideration of their impact on actions for digni-
tary harm and general emotional distress.
This Article will examine the judicial opinions that have considered
whether no-fault legislation covers claims for pure nonphysical harm, or
whether such claims should be litigated as tort actions. First, the Article
summarizes the three theories of statutory construction that courts cur-
rently employ to permit tort recovery for dignitary harm and general
emotional distress. Second, it applies those theories to selected actions
for nonphysical harm in order to demonstrate their strengths and weak-
nesses. Finally, the Article offers proposals for legislative reform of no-
fault plans. It suggests a broad spectrum of amendments that would
explicitly permit tort recovery in actions for dignitary harm and general
emotional distress. Enactment of the proposed reforms would help to
clarify this murky area of no-fault compensation legislation.
This Article does not explore the question of whether tort liability
for pure nonphysical harm should be replaced by a no-fault compensa-
tion plan. That topic has been explored elsewhere in this symposium.16
This Article assumes no alteration in the existing coverage of no-fault
compensation legislation. Instead, it suggests various ways in which tort
liability might augment current no-fault plans.17 Allowing supplemental
tort recovery for pure nonphysical harm can serve to vindicate and com-
pensate the plaintiff's dignitary interests. It can also deter the infliction
of nonphysical harm and punish those who maliciously interfere with
another person's civil rights, privacy rights, or other dignitary interests.
Thus this Article envisions that no-fault plans will be the primary source
14. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West
Supp. 1984).
15. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 41.10-.40, 42.20-.24 (1982).
16. Sugarman, DoingAway With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 660 (1985).
17. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CON-
TINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984);
Fleming, supra note 1, at 9-1, 9-36 to 9-42; Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 58 AUSTL. L.J. 131
(1984); Love, Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability for Punitive Dam-
ages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 231 (1983); Pedrick, Does Tort
Law Have a Future?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 782 (1978).
1985]
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of compensation for physical injuries and for physical or mental disabili-
ties, whereas tort liability will be the source of compensation for any pure
nonphysical harm that is not covered by workers' compensation legisla-
tion. In addition, tort liability will be authorized to punish and deter
egregious wrongdoers."8
I
THEORIES OF TORT RECOVERY
There are two theories of statutory construction which the courts
have used to authorize tort recovery for both physical and nonphysical
harm after the enactment of a no-fault plan: the cumulative action the-
ory and the alternative action theory. The cumulative action theory per-
mits a cause of action for tort damages in addition to a claim for no-fault
benefits. The benefits are set off against the tort judgment to avoid
double recovery.19 Under the alternative action theory, a tort action is
authorized in lieu of no-fault compensation.20 Some jurisdictions permit
the injured party to elect between no-fault benefits and tort damages, but
usually the judiciary or the agency administering the no-fault statute
makes the choice pursuant to legislative guidelines.21
A third theory, which I will call the cumulative remedy theory, has
recently emerged, particularly in actions for nonphysical harm. Courts
applying this theory permit the injured person to split the cause of action.
The plaintiff then may recover no-fault benefits up to the statutory maxi-
mum for the types of harm covered by the statute and tort damages,
including punitive damages, for all other types of harm.22 The cumula-
tive remedy theory differs from the cumulative action theory in that it
prohibits the recovery of tort damages for any type of harm that is cov-
ered by a no-fault plan. The cumulative remedy theory differs from the
alternative action theory in that it authorizes tort damages as a supple-
mental remedy, rather than as an alternative to no-fault benefits.
The differences between these three theories can be further illumi-
nated by the following hypothetical. Imagine that a woman was sexually
18. I developed a similar thesis in an earlier article which proposes that tort actions for puni-
tive damages be allowed to coexist with no-fault compensation benefits. That article focuses on tort
actions by claimants who sustained physical injuries. Love, supra note 17.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 23-46. See generally Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive
Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1652-53 (1983);
Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A Blessing or a Burden? 12
HoFSrRA L. REv. 181, 202-07 (1983); Note, Intentional Employer Torts: A Matter for the California
Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 651, 678-84 (1981).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 47-139. See generally Note, Judicial Misapplication of
the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act to Injuries Resulting from an Employer's Wilful Conduct,
13 VAL. U.L. Rav. 561, 582-87 (1979).
21. Love, supra note 17, at 258-73.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 140-73.
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harassed by her employer and suffered both physical and nonphysical
injuries. Under the cumulative action theory, the victim would receive
no-fault benefits - limited compensation for economic loss - as reim-
bursement for her physical and mental disabilities. She would also be
permitted to recover unlimited compensatory tort damages for her medi-
cal expenses, lost earning capacity, pain and suffering, and pure nonphys-
ical harm. In addition, she could recover punitive damages upon proof
of malicious misconduct. Her tort recovery would be reduced by the
amount of her no-fault benefits. Under the alternative action theory, the
victim would receive either no-fault benefits or tort damages. Under the
cumulative remedy theory, the victim would receive no-fault benefits (lim-
ited compensation for economic loss) as reimbursement for her physical
and mental disabilities. In addition, she could sue in tort for her pure
nonphysical harm and for punitive damages. She would be prohibited
from recovering tort damages for her medical expenses, lost earning
capacity, and pain and suffering because these types of harm are covered
by the no-fault plan.
In a few jurisdictions, statutes have authorized the three theories of
tort recovery discussed in this Part of the Article. Those statutes will be
discussed at the beginning of each Section. In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, the courts have developed the theories, and therefore the primary
focus of this Part is on judicial opinions.
A. Cumulative Action
Three states (Oregon, Washington and West Virginia) have enacted
workers' compensation legislation authorizing a cumulative tort action
for acts done by an employer with the "deliberate intention" to cause
personal "injury or death."23 The phrase "deliberate intention" has been
interpreted to mean that the employer acted with a "consciously, subjec-
tively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of
injury or death to an employee."'24 The primary purpose of these statutes
23. The West Virginia statute provides:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to
produce such injury or death, the employee. shall have the privilege to take under this
chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not
been enacted, for any excess damages over the amount received or receivable under this
chapter.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (Supp. 1984). Accord OR. REv. STAT. § 656.156 (1983); WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Supp. 1985). See generally Love, supra note 17, at 252-57. For a discus-
sion of the policy considerations that justify a statutory cumulative tort action, see Newby v. Gerry,
690 P.2d 603, 607-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (tort action against co-employee).
24. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1984). This statutory definition was enacted to over-
ride Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 705, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978), which
had construed the phrase "deliberate intention" to encompass both intentional and reckless
misconduct.
19851
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is to provide additional compensation and punitive damages to the vic-
tims of deliberately inflicted physical injury or death.
No plaintiff has successfully invoked any of these statutes in seeking
tort recovery for purely nonphysical harm.25 Moreover, even if a court
were willing to construe the term "injury" to cover pure nonphysical
harm, the plaintiff's opportunity to recover under the statute would still
be severely restricted by the specific intent requirement. Nevertheless,
these statutory causes of action have inspired the California judiciary to
develop the cumulative action theory as a basis for awarding damages for
nonphysical harm to employees.
The first California case to recognize the cumulative action theory
was Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange.26 The plaintiff charged that a
workers' compensation insurer had harassed her in an outrageous man-
ner during its investigation of her successful claim." The California
Supreme Court allowed her to bring a tort action for assault, battery and
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. A California statute
granted the workers' compensation insurer immunity from suit by an
employee who had received workers' compensation benefits. 28 The court
held, however, that the insurer could not invoke the statutory immunity
when, "as in the instant case, . . . such insurer intentionally embarks
upon a deceitful course of conduct in its investigation which causes
injury to the subject of the investigation."29 The court distinguished
between negligent and intentional misconduct and concluded that an
action at law for the insurer's intentional torts would not impair the
objective of workers' compensation legislation.
The Unruh court applied the cumulative action theory to "inten-
tional" misconduct. Subsequent decisions by the California courts of
appeal31 have confined the theory to cases involving "fraudulent, deceit-
25. In Hardy v. State, 38 Wash. App. 399, 685 P.2d 610 (1984), the plaintiff sought to recover
tort damages for general harassment under the Washington statute, but her claim was denied
because she failed to prove that the alleged harasser had acted within the scope of his employment.
26. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972). The court's adoption of the
cumulative action theory permitted the plaintiff to recover tort damages despite the exclusive remedy
provisions of California's workers' compensation legislation. See generally Love, supra note 17, at
257-62.
27. Unruh, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
28. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3850, 3852 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984).
29. Unruh, 7 Cal. 3d at 630, 498 P.2d at 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr at 825.
30. Id.
31. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 320, 210 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1985);
Denning v. Esis Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 946, 189 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1983); Droz v. Pacific Nat'l Ins.
Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 181, 188 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1983); Depew v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 135
Cal. App. 3d 574, 185 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1982); Fremont Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App.
3d 879, 184 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1982); Ricard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 132 Cal. App. 3d 886, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 502 (1982); Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15, 171 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1981).
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ful, outrageous, [or] perfidious" tortious acts by the insurer.32 Thus,
unless the California Supreme Court reiterates the broad test of intent
articulated in Unruh, this judicially recognized tort action will require
the same proof of specific intent as is currently required by the Oregon,
Washington and West Virginia statutes. 33
The California Supreme Court has also recognized the cumulative
action theory in a case of employer misconduct. In Johns-Manville Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Superior Court,34 it held that an employee seeking workers'
compensation benefits for a disability caused by exposure to asbestos
could simultaneously bring a tort action for aggravation of the disease
resulting from the employer's fraudulent concealment of the fact that the
plaintiff had asbestosis. The court perceived a trend toward allowing an
action at law for injuries suffered in employment "if the employer acts
deliberately for the purpose of injuring the employee or if the harm
resulting from the intentional misconduct consists of aggravation of an
initial work-related injury."35
The supreme court's phraseology is strikingly similar to the lan-
guage of the Oregon, Washington and West Virginia statutes, 36 which
appears to focus on physical injury. However, one court of appeal in
California has extended the Johns-Manville doctrine to an action for non-
physical harm caused by an employer. In McGee v. McNally,37 the court
held that the victim of a "campaign of harassment designed by his super-
visors to deprive him of his job" could bring a tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress38 even though he also was entitled to
workers' compensation benefits for the physical harm caused by the har-
assment.39 Citing Johns-Manville, the court found that workers' com-
pensation "was not intended to preclude certain actions based on rare
instances of malicious oppression."'
The California judiciary's development of a cumulative action the-
ory has now been endorsed, at least in part, by the California legisla-
ture.41 In 1982, the legislature amended the workers' compensation
32. Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15, 19, 171 Cal. Rptr. 164,
165 (1981).
33. See supra note 23.
34. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) Che workers' compensation
benefits sought by the employee covered both the injury from the original exposure to asbestos and
the aggravation of the disease caused by the employer's fradulent conduct.).
35. Id. at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
36. See supra note 23.
37. 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981).
38. Id. at 893-95, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
39. Id. at 894-95, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
40. Id. at 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 256; see also Young v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 214 Cal. Rptr.
400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (action for "intentional" infliction of emotional distress, assault, and
battery).
41. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1985).
1985]
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statute to allow an employee to bring an action at law against an
employer, even after recovering workers' compensation benefits, in the
following instances:
(1) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a will-
ful physical assault by the employer. (2) Where the employee's injury is
aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the existence of
the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the
employer's liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused
by the aggravation. 42
Although the statute clearly codifies Johns-Manville, it falls short of
codifying Unruh's recognition of a cumulative cause of action for any
intentional misconduct. The first section of the statute neither defines
"willful" nor specifies whether the injury caused by the "physical
assault" must also be physical.43 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
statute would permit recovery in a case like McGee, where the harm was
caused by a "campaign of harassment." 4 The second part of the statute
is worded clearly, but the scope of the term "injury" is undefined. The
California legislation may thus be construed expansively to provide a
statutory basis for the courts to allow cumulative actions for nonphysical
harm, at least in actions for fraudulent concealment. Alternatively, the
statute may be interpreted restrictively to permit cumulative actions only
for physical harm caused by willful misconduct or aggravated by fraudu-
lent concealment of the existence of an injury.
This examination of the California case law demonstrates the limita-
tions of the cumulative action theory as applied to tort actions for non-
physical harm. The theory allows recovery only for egregious
misconduct. Even though many actions for nonphysical harm are inten-
tional tort actions, it will usually be difficult to prove that the defendant
"consciously, subjectively and deliberately" a intended to cause nonphys-
ical harm to the plaintiff or engaged in "fraudulent," "perfidious" or
"outrageous" conduct.46
B. Alternative Action
The alternative action theory mandates a choice between a tort
claim and no-fault benefits. In this way it is more limited than the cumu-
lative action theory. On the other hand, the alternative action theory is
42. Id
43. In Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 225, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696, 700 (1983),
the court construed an exception to California's exclusive remedy clause for a willful "physical act of
aggression." The court held the exception required proof of a physical act causing a reasonable fear
of harm, but held that "the resulting harm need not also be physical."
44. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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broader than the cumulative action theory insofar as it may permit a tort
claim for intentional employer misconduct that involves neither a specific
intent to injure nor outrageous misconduct. This section will explore the
various statutory and judicial permutations of the alternative action
theory.
1. Statutory Cause of Action
Seven jurisdictions in the United States have statutes creating an
alternative tort action in cases of intentional misconduct by the
employer. Three of these states have legislation that gives the employee
an explicit option:
If injury or death results to an employe[e] through the deliberate inten-
tion of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employe[e] or
his dependents may take under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a
cause of action at law against the employer as if this chapter had not been
passed. .... 47
Three other states have created statutory exceptions to their exclusive
remedy clauses for "intentional" torts,4 8 wrongs49 or acts.50 One state
has authorized an alternative tort action for "wilful or unprovoked phys-
ical aggression."'"
The statutory alternative tort actions have proven to be no more
useful to victims of nonphysical harm than the statutory cumulative tort
actions discussed in the preceding section. It is questionable whether the
statutory exceptions are applicable to actions for nonphysical injuries.5 2
If so, proof of specific intent to harm is usually required. 53 Not surpris-
ingly, then, all but one54 of the cases from these seven jurisdictions that
have allowed tort actions for nonphysical harm have permitted recovery
47. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Michie 1983). Accord MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 44 (1957). The Arizona statute is worded somewhat differently:
A. The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained
by an employee. . . is the exclusive remedy against the employer. . . , except that if the
injury is caused by the employer's wilful misconduct,. . . and the act causing the injury is
the personal act of the employer,. . . and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life,
limb or bodily safety of employees, the injured employee may either claim compensation or
maintain an action at law for damages ....
B. "Wilful misconduct" as used in this section means an act done knowingly and
purposely with the direct object of injuring another.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1984-1985).
48. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
50. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1984).
51. IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (1973).
52, Eg. Yeend v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 335-37, 659 P.2d 87, 89-91 (1982)
(Huntley, J., dissenting).
53. See generally Love, supra note 17, at 263-64.
54. Maggio v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., 391 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 396 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1981).
1985]
HeinOnline  -- 73 Cal. L. Rev. 865 1985
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
in spite of, rather than in reliance upon, the statutory provisions."
Instead of requiring proof of specific intent pursuant to the statutory
provisions, the cases have recognized an alternative tort action based on
the theory that an action for nonphysical harm lies outside the scope of
the workers' compensation plan, and thus is unaffected by the exclusive
remedy clause.5 6 For example, in Columbia Sussex Corporation v. Hay, 7
a Kentucky court permitted the plaintiff to bring tort actions for false
imprisonment and slander per se against her employer. The court inter-
preted the Kentucky statute quoted in the opening paragraph of this Sec-
tion as authorizing a tort action only if the plaintiff's injury resulted from
"willful and physical aggression."" It then held that the plaintiff did not
have to fit her case within the language of the statute because
[t]he purpose of Workers' Compensation is to redress physical and
mental injuries and damages arising from the employment relationship.
The crux of a slander per se action is not injury, for no actual damages
are required to be shown. Likewise, false imprisonment stands or falls
upon elements which may result in damages, but again such are not req-
uisite for a prima facie case.59
Since the plaintiff could allege a prima facie tort action without proof of
actual harm, there was "nothing for which the Workers' Compensation
Act would compensate."60 Therefore, the plaintiff was free to proceed in
a tort action outside the scope of the workers' compensation legislation.
Had her injury come within the scope of the no-fault plan, her tort action
would have been barred because she would have been unable to prove the
"willful and physical aggression" required to bring her action within the
statutory exception to the exclusive remedy clause.
In another case,6 the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff could bring
a tort action against her employer and its workers' compensation carrier
for their bad-faith refusal to pay workers' compensation benefits. The
plaintiff sought to rely62 on the South Dakota statute creating an excep-
tion to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy clause in cases of
"intentional wrongdoing."63 Instead, the court allowed the plaintiff to
sue in tort by holding that her action fell outside the scope of the work-
ers' compensation legislation because the statute does not cover "torts
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 98-118. The technique of statutory construction
employed by these courts is discussed more fully infra in the text accompanying notes 76-139.
57. 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
58. Id. at 278.
59. Id. at 279.
60. Id.
61. Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 1261 n.4.
63. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978).
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which occur independent of the industrial injury.""
In only one case, Maggio v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc. ,65 has a
court from one of these seven jurisdictions relied on the statutory alterna-
tive action to permit the plaintiff to sue in tort for nonphysical harm.
The Louisiana workers' compensation statute provides: "Nothing in this
Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer. .. , civil or criminal,
resulting from an intentional act."' 66 In Maggio, the court held the plain-
tiff had satisfied the "intentional act" requirement by alleging that the
defendant engaged in a "pattern of outrageous, harassing conduct" of
such a nature as "to necessarily be calculated and intended to make
plaintiff's working conditions unbearable and to cause him mental and
emotional distress.", 6
7
Although the courts in these seven jurisdictions usually have not
chosen to rely upon the statutes authorizing alternative tort actions in
permitting recovery for nonphysical harm, the legislation could be
invoked in future cases. The statutes which courts currently interpret to
require proof of intent to cause physical injury68 could be construed to
permit proof of specific intent to cause either physical or nonphysical
harm.69 In addition, the exclusive remedy clauses that create exceptions
for "intentional" torts, wrongs or acts70 could readily be interpreted to
allow actions for nonphysical harm, as in Maggio.7 1 Even the Idaho
exclusive remedy clause, which creates an exception for "willful or
unprovoked physical aggression,"72 could be construed to allow certain
intentional nonphysical tort actions. For example, the dissenting judge
in Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 73 suggested that the Idaho statute
should be interpreted to allow actions for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress because
[the] statute was enacted at a time in Idaho history when we did not have
a common law cause of action for "intentional or reckless infliction of
64. Hollman, 712 F.2d at 1261.
65. 391 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1984).
67. 391 So. 2d at 950.
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. Eg., Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
71. Maggio v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., 391 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1980). The
Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that plaintiffs may bring alternative tort actions based on proof
of either deliberate or constructive intent:
The meaning of "intent" is that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the
physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his con-
duct; or (2) knows that that result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct,
whatever his desire may be as to that result.
Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981).
72. IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (1973).
73. 104 Idaho 333, 335-36, 659 P.2d 87, 89 (1982).
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emotional distress" .... Since the Idaho legislature evidenced an
intent to exclude willful and unprovoked acts by the employer from
workmen's compensation coverage, it is likely that had there been a cause
of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress (absent
direct physical contact) at the time the statute was enacted, that type of
willful action by an employer would have been excluded along with the
physical aggression.7 4
The majority did not contradict the dissenting judge's interpretation of
the statute. Instead, the majority held that the plaintiff had failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 75
2. Judicially Created Cause of Action
In the states that do not have statutory cumulative or alternative
tort actions, the. workers' compensation statutes contain exclusive rem-
edy provisions that on their face appear to create an absolute bar to all
tort litigation against an employer.76 These provisions typically provide
that the availability of workers' compensation "shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of [the] employee. . . [against the employer in an
action] at common law . . . .,, Some jurisdictions have interpreted
these exclusive remedy clauses literally, creating an absolute immunity
for employers.78 Most courts, however, have carved out exceptions to
the exclusive remedy provisions. By judicial decree, they have author-
74. Id. at 335-36, 659 P.2d at 89-90.
75. Id. at 334, 659 P.2d at 88.
76. ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-
1304 (Supp. 1983); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-102
(Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a) (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (1983);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp.
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West Supp.
1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 28 (1978); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 23-24 (West 1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 418.131 (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.120(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
111 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.370(1) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.12 (Supp. 1983);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1978); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.74 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-20 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1.
540 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108 (1983); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 622
(1978); VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT.
§ 27-12-103 (1984).
For a general discussion of exclusive remedy provisions, see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§§ 65.00-67.50 (1983).
77. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (1983).
78. Eg., Moore v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)
(describing prior Michigan law).
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ized alternative common law actions for intentional torts,79 nonphysical
harms not covered by the no-fault plan, 0 and for injuries that do not
"arise out of" the employment.81
a. Tort Action for Injury Not Caused "'By Accident"
Early workers' compensation statutes provided that no-fault benefits
were available only for injury caused "by accident" or for "accidental
injury,""2 and many jurisdictions have retained these restrictions.83 Sev-
eral courts have construed the phrase to mean that workers' compensa-
tion is the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by negligence.84 Then
they have created an exception to the exclusive remedy clause for inten-
tional tort actions.8 The exception is analogous to the statutory excep-
tion discussed in the preceding Section.86 These courts have defined
"accident" from the actor's point of view. They have rejected the argu-
ment that the employers' intentional torts were accidental from the
employee's viewpoint. One court characterized the argument as "a trav-
esty on the use of the English language." ' At the same time, in an effort
to provide employers with an appropriate measure of protection from the
resulting tort liability, these courts have restrictively construed the term
"intentional." 88 They have imposed direct liability only when the
employer or the employer's alter ego specifically intended to cause physi-
cal or nonphysical harm. They have barred vicarious liability actions
against an employer for an intentional tort committed by a supervisory
employee on the grounds that such an incident is an "industrial mishap"
from the employer's perspective.8 9 Courts in these jurisdictions have
authoized tort actions for false imprisonment, 9° defamation, 91 assault
79. See infra text accompanying notes 82-97.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 98-118.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 119-39.
82. lB A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 37.00-.20 (1982). See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note
1, § 5.20 (1984).
83. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at app. A, table 2 (1984) (table of workers' compensation
statutes defining the term "accident").
84. Eg., Jackman v. Fisher, 91 A.D.2d 602, 603, 456 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (1982).
85. Eg., Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.11 n.2 (1983).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
87. Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55, 9 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940).
88. E.g., Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 868, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308,
310 (1982).
89. Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); accord Jett v. Dunlap, 179
Conn. 215, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979); Continental Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176, 1182 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1982); Jones v. State, 96 A.D.2d 105, 468 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1983); Thompson v.
Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 868, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310-11 (1982).
90. Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.) (Georgia law), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
830 (1964); Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316 (1961); Miller v. McRae's, Inc.,
444 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984).
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and offensive battery.92
Other courts, in an effort to provide the broadest possible no-fault
coverage, have construed the term "accident" from the employee's per-
spective, defining it as an "untoward event which is not expected or
designed." 93 Accordingly, they have held that workers' compensation
covers "unexpected" intentional torts, and that employers who commit
such acts are immune from tort liability94 unless the plaintiff can invoke
some other exception to the exclusive remedy clause.
95
Recent statutory developments have further undermined the "acci-
dental injury" approach to the alternative action theory. Several legisla-
tures have expanded workers' compensation coverage to encompass
occupational diseases by replacing the "accidental injury" requirement
with one of "personal injury." 96 Such an amendment effectively abol-
ishes the statutory basis for the judicially recognized intentional tort
action because it makes no-fault benefits available for any type of per-
sonal injury, regardless of how the injury was caused. Only a few legisla-
tures have had the foresight to preserve alternative tort actions based on
the "accidental injury" approach while expanding coverage; they have
specified that "the disablement of an employee resulting from an occupa-
tional disease. . . shall be treated as the happening of an accident." 97
b. Tort Action for Types of Harm Not Covered by No-Fault
Legislation
Instead of relying on the intentional nature of the employer's con-
duct, a number of jurisdictions have allowed an alternative tort action on
the basis that the plaintiffs harm was not the type of harm that workers'
compensation legislation was designed to cover. 98 At first, this approach
resulted in comprehensive tort liability for nonphysical harm, since
workers' compensation legislation typically covered only physical injury
91. Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
92. Leopold v. Britt, 58 A.D.2d 856, 396 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1977); Stewart v. MeLellan's Stores
Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940). See generally Comment, Employer Liability for Assaults by
Employees, 48 Mo. L. REv. 655 (1983).
93. In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 490, 111 N.E. 379, 380 (1916); see also Daniels v. Swofford,
286 S.E.2d 582, 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C.
427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962)). See generally IB A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 37.20 (1982).
94. Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-line Co., 632 F.2d 867, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1980)
(construing Oklahoma law); Brown v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 167 Mont. 418, 539 P.2d 374 (1975); see
also Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Colo. 1982) (discussing the prior Colorado workers'
compensation statute).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 119-39.
96. Eg., Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Colo. 1982). See generally 1B A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 37.30 (1982).
97. E.g., N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 38 (McKinney 1965).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
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plus pain and suffering. 9 Thus, employees were entitled to sue employ-
ers in tort for false imprisonment, defamation, and invasion of privacy."°°
However, the "nonphysical harm" approach also has been undermined
by the modem expansion of workers' compensation to cover "personal
injury.' 10 1 Today, a majority of jurisdictions allow no-fault benefits not
only for a physical or mental stimulus causing physical injury, 102 but also
for a physical trauma causing nervous injury, 103 or a mental stimulus
causing nervous injury."°
In order to retain tort liability for nonphysical harm in those juris-
dictions that permit workers' compensation for purely nervous injury,105
the courts have had to reformulate the "nonphysical harm" approach.106
Sometimes, the courts have distinguished between "personal injury,"
which is covered by workers' compensation legislation, and "interference
with a legal right," which is not. 07 Using this distinction, they have
permitted tort recovery for such dignitary harms as false imprison-
ment,10 8 defamation, 0 9 invasion of privacy, 1  and civil rights
99. See generally lB A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 42.10-.11 (1982).
100. E.g., Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio App. 2d 55, 351 N.E.2d 775 (1973). In
refusing to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, the court said "it is difficult ... to consider ... torts,
such as slander, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy, as falling within the definition of
'injury' as a 'physical or traumatic damage or harm. . . caused by accidental means.'" Id. at 57,
351 N.E.2d at 777. The court did acknowledge that the plaintiff's case for assault and offensive
battery presented a closer question. Id. Accord Federal Rice Drug Co. v. Queen Ins. Co., 463 F.2d
626, 630-31 (3d Cir. 1972); Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277, 1281-82 (Del. Super. Ct.
1981) (summary judgment for defendant denied in action for sexual assault against co-employee who
claimed a statutory immunity; plaintiff given an opportunity to prove that assault was not an indus-
trial "injury," defined as "violence to the physical structure of the body").
101. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. See generally IB A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 42.20 (1982).
102. Id. § 42.21.
103. Id. § 42.22.
104. Id. § 42.23.
105. Id. §§ 42.22-.23. See generally Hirsh & Monroe, Psychological Mental or Emotional Injury
Induced by Trauma: Expanding Employer Liability Under Workers' Compensation, 30 MED. TRiAL
TECH. Q. 265 (1984); Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REv. 263 (1983); Note, Determining
the Compensability of Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 193
(1981).
106. Some courts have refused to reformulate the theory, and they bar tort actions for nonphysi-
cal harm on the grounds that mental injury is now compensable under workers' compensation. Eg.,
Baker v. Wendy's, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984) (defendant's motion for summary judgment
granted in action by employee against employer for sexual harassment on theories of assault, offen-
sive battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
107. See, eg., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 552, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980)
(allowing tort action for malicious prosecution because "the essence of the tort is not physical or
mental injury, but interference with the right to be free from unjustifiable litigation") (citing W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 834 (4th ed. 1971)). See generally 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 68.30-.36(e) (1983).
108. Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983); Mason v.
HeinOnline  -- 73 Cal. L. Rev. 871 1985
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:857
violations.11
Under the reformulated "nonphysical harm" approach, many
courts have found it conceptually difficult to allow tort recovery in
actions for emotional harm (such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, assault, and offensive battery) because they are not actions for
"interference with a legal right.""' 2 To permit the imposition of tort lia-
bility in actions for emotional harm, some courts have drawn a distinc-
tion between emotional distress resulting in "disability," which is
covered by no-fault benefits, and "general emotional distress," which is
not. 13 The basis for the "general emotional distress" distinction is now
beginning to erode, however, because the coverage of no-fault benefits is
being expanded in a few jurisdictions to encompass "mental anguish,
mental distress or emotional suffering."' 14
Using the "nonphysical harm" approach discussed in this Section
requires that a distinction be drawn between the harm covered by work-
ers' compensation and that covered by tort liabilty. This distinction is
difficult to apply in cases of "mixed damages.""' 5 A plaintiff who has
suffered both physical and nonphysical harm," 6 or both emotional dis-
District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978); Moore v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc., 190 N.W.2d
262 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
109. Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Foley v. Polaroid Corp.,
381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980).
110. In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 492, 111 N.E. 379, 381 (1916) (dictum).
111. DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983); Mills v. Jefferson Bank E., 559
F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1983); Grichenko v. United States Postal Serv., 524 F. Supp. 672 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), af'd mem., 751 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1984); Sullivan v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Wis.
1977).
112. Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (tort action allowed for
defamation, but not for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381
Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980) (tort actions allowed for defamation and malicious prosecution,
but not for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
113. Ritter v. Allied Chem. Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1360 (D.S.C. 1968) (offensive battery), ajJ'd,
407 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1969); Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1983) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d
196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979) (same); Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal, App. 3d
531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) (same); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1978) (same); Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978) (assault and
battery); Kissinger v. Mannor, 285 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940) (offensive
battery).
114. Williams v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Baker v. Wendy's, Inc., 687
P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984). The workers' compensation cases allowing no-fault benefits for mental disor-
ders are collected in Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 161 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
115. See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.34(a) (1983).
116. Hollywood Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 754, 210 Cal. Rptr.
619 (1985); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979) (barring tort
action for nonphysical harm due to allegations of physical injury and disability); Ankeny v. Lock-
heed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) (barring tort action for
harassment leading to permanent disability); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1982); Cole v.
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tress causing mental disability and general emotional distress,117 usually
is barred from suing in tort by the exclusive remedy clause. Some courts
have ameliorated this problem by permitting the tort plaintiff to allege
that the harm sustained was purely nonphysical harm or general emo-
tional distress.118
c. Tort Action for Injury Not Arising out of Employment
The courts that adopted the alternative action theory based on the
type of harm suffered have traditionally disregarded the nature of the
employer's conduct." 9 However, as workers' compensation coverage
has expanded to encompass more nonphysical harms, these courts have
found themselves barring tort recovery in actions for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, assault, and offensive battery, even when the
employee has not been adequately compensated by no-fault benefits. 20
In an effort to improve compensation in such cases, they have begun to
allow alternative tort actions by developing approaches different from the
"nonphysical harm" approach.12 '
Some of these courts at first redefined the term "personal injury" to
mean an unintentional injury, thereby permitting tort actions for inten-
Dow Chem. Co., 315 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (barring tort action for emotional hardship
based on physical injury resulting in sterility).
117. Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982)
(workers' compensation for anxiety reaction bars tort action for loss to reputation).
118. Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1983); Vigil v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
555 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983); Luna v. City & County of Denver, 537 F. Supp. 798 (D. Colo.
1982); McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981); Renteria v. County of
Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
119. Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Battista v.
Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
These courts may have felt compelled to look only to the type of harm sustained because the
legislature expanded workers' compensation to cover occupational disease by substituting the term
"personal injury" for "accidental injury." See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
120. For example, the trial court in Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147
Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978), felt compelled by California precedents to bar an action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress even though the plaintiff's "mental suffering" was noncompensable.
121. For example, in Renteria the court permitted the plaintiff to proceed in tort for the inten-
tional (as opposed to the negligent) infliction of emotional distress because "[w]e have here not an
isolated instance of a physical injury which is noncompensable, but an entire class of civil wrongs
outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation system." Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
Moreover, the court emphasized that the injury had been caused by intentional wrongdoing:
While it is possible to believe that the Legislature intended that employees lose their
right to compensation for certain forms of negligently or accidentally inflicted physical
injuries in exchange for a system of workers' compensation featuring liability without fault,
compulsory insurance, and prompt medical care, it is much more difficult to believe that
the Legislature intended the employee to surrender all right to any form of compensation
for mental suffering caused by extreme and outrageous misconduct by an employer. It
would indeed be ironic if the Workers' Compensation Act, created to benefit employees,
were to be interpreted to shield the employer from all liability for such conduct. We
decline to interpret it in this fashion.
Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (footnote omitted).
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tionally inflicted nonphysical harm. 22 This extremely result-oriented
approach has now yielded to one that focuses on the language of the no-
fault legislation. 2 3 Most workers' compensation statutes provide that
benefits will be awarded for injuries "arising out of and in the course of
employment."1 24 Recent decisions suggest that courts should look to
this language as part of a two-step analysis in determining whether to
authorize an alternative tort action.1 25 First, they should ask whether
the tort plaintiff sustained "personal injury" under the workers' compen-
sation statute. If not, tort recovery is allowed. If "personal injury" was
sustained, then the courts should determine whether the injury "arose
out of employment." If the injury "arose out of employment," tort
recovery is denied. If it did not, tort recovery is permitted even though
the injury is a type of harm covered by workers' compensation. Courts
applying this analysis have held that certain intentional torts did not
"arise out of employment," 1 26 particularly when the employer acted with
specific intent to cause nonphysical harm to the employee.1 27 The ration-
ale behind these cases is that workers' compensation substitutes for tort
recovery only if the employee's injuries have been caused by the ordinary
risks of employment. Deliberate injury by an employer is not considered
one of the ordinary risks.
There are two advantages to the "arising out of" approach to recog-
nizing an alternative tort action. First, it permits the judiciary to concen-
trate on the policy considerations behind the enactment of no-fault
legislation. Workers' compensation is a compromise between employers
and employees, whereby workers relinquished their common law reme-
dies for employment-related injuries in exchange for limited benefits that
122. DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 1983); Barnes v. Double Seal
Glass Co., 341 N.W.2d 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (summarizing Michigan cases).
123. For a summary of the statutory provisions that establish the scope of workers' compensa-
tion coverage, see 1 A. LARsON, supra note 1, § 6.10 (1984).
124. Forty-two states have adopted the quoted coverage formula. Id.
125. E.g., Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 970, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (1980); Tredway
v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734-35 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); McKinley v.
Holiday Inn, 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
126. Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980)
(same); Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 427 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d
711 (1980) (defamation); Kissinger v. Mannor, 285 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress). Contra Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa
1983) (intentional denial of care); Baker v. Wendy's, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery).
127. Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890 & n.6 (D. Clo. 1982) (reserving
specific intent issue); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Colo. 1982) (dictum); Collier v. Wagner
Castings Co., 81111. 2d 229, 238-39, 408 N.E.2d 198, 202 (1980); Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co.,
341 N.W.2d 812, 818-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (Burns, J., concurring).
[Vol. 73:857
HeinOnline  -- 73 Cal. L. Rev. 874 1985
DIGNITARY TORTS
are paid promptly, efficiently, and without proof of fault. 28 The "arising
out of" approach enables judges to examine the facts of each case, asking
themselves whether it would be within the spirit of the workers' compen-
sation compromise to immunize the employer from tort liability. For
example, in jurisdictions that provide no-fault benefits for intentionally
inflicted harm, the "arising out of" approach has been invoked to justify
tort liability for deliberate civil rights violations. 129 In the words of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "We would, of course, be
reluctant to hold that civil rights violations were a hazard of employment
in the Commonwealth."' 3 °
The second advantage of the "arising out of" approach is its flexibil-
ity. In this respect, it differs from the "accidental injury" approach,
which rigidly draws a line between negligent acts (that are covered by
workers' compensation) and intentional acts (that are subject to tort lia-
bility)."' The "arising out of" approach, by contrast, provides a frame-
work within which a court may impose tort liability for a wide range of
wrongs. Judgments may be entered against an employer not only for
egregious misconduct and specific intent to harm,'32 but also for lesser
acts of recklessness or negligence 133 whenever the risk of loss is one that
society wishes to place on the tortfeasor rather than on the consuming
public.' 34 For example, some courts have used the theory to justify a tort
action against an employer for negligently condoning ongoing acts of sex-
ual harassment by a supervisor. 35 These courts have held that the "risk
of verbal and physical abuse of a sexual nature" is in no way connected
with an employee's job responsibilities.' 36 Instead, they have character-
ized sexual harassment as a tortious act committed for purely personal
128. Love, supra note 17, at 244-45.
129. DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983); Williams v. United States, 565
F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980).
130. Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 553, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
133. E.g., Cox v. Brazzo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, affid, 251 Ga. 491, 307 S.E.2d 474
(1983); Murphy v. ARA Servs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982).
134. See generally 1 A. LARSoN, supra note 1, §§ 11.16-.23, 11.40 (1984).
135. Cox v. Brazzo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, afl'd, 251 Ga. 491, 307 S.E.2d 474 (1983);
Murphy v. ARA Servs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982). Contra Baker v. Wendy's, Inc.,
687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984). See generally C. MAcKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979); Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment, 14 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 113 (1983); Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to
Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 879 (1980).
136. Murphy v. ARA Servs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 862, 298 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1982). Compare
Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co., 585 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (tort action allowed for sex-
based harassment by-supervisors that allegedly was the result of a personal, private quarrel) with
Hood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (workers' compensation is
exclusive remedy for nonsexual abuse resulting from employer-employee relationship).
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reasons by supervisory personnel. 137 Since sexual harassment is of "no
tangible benefit to the employer," 138 the courts have refused "to credit
the suggestion that [the legislature] intended to permit licentious behav-
ior under the rubric of workmen's compensation ....
C. Cumulative Remedy
The primary drawback to the recognition of an employee's right to
bring an alternative tort action is that it mandates an "either-or"
approach to a problem that needs a "both-and" solution. Whenever an
employee has suffered a combination of physical, mental, and dignitary
injuries, the optimal remedy would be to authorize no-fault benefits for
the harm that is covered by workers' compensation (honoring statutory
limits on the amount recoverable), and tort damages for the harm that is
not. To date, only New Zealand has clearly recognized such a cumula-
tive remedy.1" However, recent decisions by courts in California and
Michigan suggest that these jurisdictions may be on the verge of adopting
the theory as well. 141
1. New Zealand
New Zealand has a comprehensive accident compensation plan.142
The plan covers not only work-related injuries, but extends to any "per-
sonal injury by accident." 143 An injured claimant receives: (1) compen-
sation for medical expenses, rehabilitation treatment, and pecuniary
losses not related to earnings; (2) earnings-related compensation (eighty
percent of pre-accident earnings up to a maximum ceiling); (3) a lump
sum benefit for permanent loss or impairment of bodily function (up to
$17,000); and (4) a lump sum benefit for such nonphysical harm as pain
and suffering and loss of amenities (up to $10,000).11 The primary pur-
pose of this legislation is to provide compensation to all accident
victims. 145
The Accident Compensation Act contains an exclusive remedy
clause which provides: "[W]here any person suffers personal injury by
accident in New Zealand . . . , no proceedings for damages arising
137. Murphy v. ARA Servs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 862, 298 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1982); accord Cox v.
Brazzo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, affld, 251 Ga. 491, 307 S.E.2d 474 (1983); Hollrah v.
Freidrich, 634 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
138. Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Colo. 1982).
139. Id. at 891; accord Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 427 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 142-52.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 159-73.
142. Accident Compensation Act of 1982, [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552.
143. Id. § 27(1).
144. Id. §§ 52-82.
145. Id. § 26.
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directly or indirectly out of the injury or death shall be brought in any
Court of New Zealand independently of this act. .. , 146 The Accident
Compensation Corporation, which administers the New Zealand plan,
recently considered whether a person who had been unlawfully arrested
by the police could sue in tort for false arrest and imprisonment or was
restricted to no-fault benefits.147 The Corporation held that the act cov-
ered the "physical and mental injury" caused by the arrest.148 However,
it held that the Act did not cover any damages for the "invasion of per-
sonal rights,"14 9 including the "unlawful deprivation of the plaintiff's lib-
erty."15 The plaintiff thus had to look to the Act for compensation of
physical or emotional harm,' but could sue in tort for the nominal,
dignitary, and punitive damages arising out of false imprisonment.' 52
The advantage of the cumulative remedy theory is that it makes no-
fault benefits, with their maximum ceiling, the exclusive remedy for the
types of harm covered by the Act. At the same time, it allows the use of
tort remedies when they are needed to vindicate the plaintiff's dignitary
interests or to punish and deter the defendant's egregious misconduct.
2. United States
No state or federal court system in the United States has followed
New Zealand's example by explicitly adopting the cumulative remedy
theory. However, several courts have moved toward it in cases that
allow a plaintiff to recover workers' compensation benefits for an indus-
trial injuryplus tort damages for a "separate and independent" nonphysi-
cal harm which an employer inflicted at a later time. 53 For example,
plaintiffs have recovered tort damages against an employer (or an insur-
ance carrier) for the following misconduct: (1) a bad-faith refusal to set-
tle a workers' compensation claim;'5 4 (2) fraudulent withholding of
information concerning the nature and extent of an occupational injury
146. Accident Compensation Act of 1982, § 27(1), [1982] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552, 1578. The Acci-
dent Compensation Corporation has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a person has cover-
age under the Act, i.e., whether there has been a "personal injury by accident." Id. § 27(3); L v. M,
[1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 519.
147. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, 9 N.Z. ACCIDENr COMPENSATION REP. 553 (1983);
Bullock, Exemplary Damages and the Accident Compensation Act, 1982 N.Z.L.J. 26.
148. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, 9 N.Z. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REP. 553, 558
(1983); Bullock, supra note 146, at 26.
149. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, [1983] 9 N.Z. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REP. 553,
558.
150. Bullock, supra note 147, at 26.
151. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, [1983] 9 N.Z. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REP. 553,
558.
152. For a discussion of New Zealand's cumulative tort remedy for punitive damages, see Love,
supra note 17, at 235-44, 273-74.
153. See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 68.32, 68.34(b)-(c), 68.36(a)-(b) (1983).
154. Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 902 (1981).
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or disease;"'5 and (3) a retaliatory discharge based on the filing of a work-
ers' compensation claim. 56 These were all cases in which the plaintiff
sustained two separate injuries. Therefore, they can be described as tort
actions for an injury that is not covered by workers' compensation 7 or
that does "not arise out of and in the course of employment."' 15 8
The cumulative remedy theory is more directly applicable to a case
in which a single act by the tortfeasor causes a variety of injuries to the
victim. Lower courts in California1 59 and Michigan' 6° have moved
toward the adoption of the cumulative remedy theory in situations where
an employee, injured by a single act of the employer, has collected work-
ers' compensation for the resulting physical or mental disability, and also
has sued in tort to vindicate his or her dignitary interests. For example,
in Howland v. Balma, 6 the California Court of Appeal held that an
employee who had settled a claim for workers' compensation benefits for
"industrial injuries-physical and mental injuries suffered by the plain-
tiff" 62-- could also bring a slander per se action against the employer.
The court characterized the gist of the action for slander per se as dam-
age to reputation,1 63 and concluded:
The harm flowing therefrom is not a "personal injury" (i.e., medical or
physical injury to the body) or a risk of employment within the purview
of workers' compensation law. . . . "In fact, an injury to reputation
affects a proprietary interest, and as such is not a personal injury at all,
any concomitant physical or mental injury notwithstanding." 164
The difference between Howland and the California cases permitting tort
recovery for nonphysical harm on an alternative action theory1 65 is that
the Howland plaintiff was permitted to recover both no-fault benefits and
tort damages. The other plaintiffs had to choose between workers' com-
pensation and judicial relief.
Michigan is another jurisdiction whose lower appellate courts have
sometimes applied the cumulative remedy theory. In Slayton v. Michi-
gan Host, Inc. 166 and McCalla v. Ellis,67 the court held that victims of
sex-based discrimination could recover workers' compensation benefits
155. Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1279; § 3[b] (1972).
156. Annot., 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 98-118.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 124-39.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 166-73.
161. 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983).
162. Id. at 905, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
163. Id. at 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Eg., Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal, Rptr. 696 (1983) (inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress).
166. 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
167. 341 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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for any resulting physical or mental disability, and could also bring a
combined tort and civil rights action for the following types of harm
caused by sexual harassment: mental anguish, loss of wages, loss of pro-
fessional esteem, damage to the plaintiff's career, loss of pension rights
and employment benefits, loss of seniority, and loss of employment. 168
The Michigan court explicitly rejected the alternative action theory,
which would have restricted the plaintiffs' recovery to no-fault bene-
fits. 169 Instead, the court held that a sex-discrimination plaintiff may
split her cause of action, recovering both no-fault benefits and tort
damages:
[T]he applicability of the exclusive remedy provision of the act turns not
upon the characterization of the asserted cause of action but upon
whether the employee has a right to recover benefits under the act ...
A civil suit for damages based upon an alleged violation of the plaintiff's
right to employment without sex discrimination is in the nature of a tort
action and, as such, concerns a personal injury to the plaintiff. . . .The
act provides compensation for disabilities resulting from a personal
injury suffered by an employee during the course of his or her employ-
ment. Thus, certain elements of damages in a sex discrimination suit
may be barred by the act's exclusive remedy provision, although gener-
ally a nonphysical tort such as sex discrimination falls outside the scope
of the act. 17
The Michigan court also explicitly rejected the alternative action
theory's assumption that noncompensable harms merge with compensa-
ble ones in cases of mixed damages. 7 ' It stated that "any prior claims
for mental suffering arising from the discrimination do not merge with
the resulting disability claim."' 7 2 The cumulative remedy theory thus
offers a different approach to sexual harrassment claims from the alterna-
tive action theory in cases of mixed damages. 173 Instead of forcing an
election between either the workers' compensation system or the tort
forum, the cumulative remedy theory permits a victim of sexual harass-
ment to claim both workers' compensation for her employment-related
disabilities and tort damages for her mental anguish and other dignitary
losses.
168. McCalla, 341 N.W.2d at 529; Slayton, 332 N.W.2d at 501. The Michigan Supreme Court
has now ruled that a plaintiff with a statutory employment discrimination remedy may sue under the
cumulative action theory for any physical, mental or emotional injuries compensated by the statute.
The court has not yet ruled on whether a plaintiff may also bring a cumulative tort action when the
source of the right involved is the common law. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d
642 (Mich. 1984).
169. Slayton, 332 N.W. 2d at 500.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. For a discussion of sexual harassment claims under the alternative tort theory, see supra
text accompanying notes 135-39.
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II
THEORIES OF TORT RECOVERY APPLIED TO SELECTED
ACTIONS FOR NONPHYSICAL HARM
This Section will evaluate the theories permitting the recovery of
tort damages for nonphysical harm in actions against a defendant claim-
ing immunity under an exclusive remedy clause. It will apply them to
selected tort actions for nonphysical harm and analyze them in specific
types of fact situations.
A. False Imprisonment
To establish a prima facie case of false imprisonment, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff.174 The
interest to be protected is primarily a dignitary one in freedom from
restraint. 175 There are no reported false imprisonment cases in which a
court has applied the cumulative action theory. This is probably because
the theory requires the plaintiff to show egregious misconduct or specific
intent to cause physical injury in order to be exempt from an exclusive
remedy provision.1 76 Although an action for false imprisonment occur-
ring under egregious circumstances could satisfy these criteria, most false
imprisonment cases brought against employers involve only a minimal
use of force and a relatively brief period of confinement. 177
Because false imprisonment actions against employers do not usu-
ally satisfy the criteria for bringing a cumulative tort action, most false
imprisonment cases have been litigated under the alternative action the-
ory. Since false imprisonment requires proof of intent, employers are
automatically subject to tort liability in jurisdictions that create an excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy clause for intentional misconduct. 7 The
exclusivity question has been more difficult in those jurisdictions that cre-
ate an exception to the exclusive remedy clause for "general emotional
distress." 179 For example, some courts have stayed false imprisonment
proceedings in order to let the Secretary of Labor determine whether a
174. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TorS § 11 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
175. Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399, 403 (D.C. App. 1978); Moore v. Federal
Dep't Stores, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d
1279, § 4 (1972).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 23-46.
177. Kg., Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984).
178. Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964);
Barnes v. Chrysler Corp., 65 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Il1. 1946); Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983); Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316
(1961); Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984). The exception for intentional miscon-
duct may be statutory, or it may be created by a judicial decision that the injury was not "acciden-
tal" or did not "arise out of employment." See supra text accompanying notes 47-53, 82-92, 124-39.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 98-118.
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confinement caused compensable harm under the Federal Employee's
Compensation Act (FECA). I0 If a plaintiff has sustained physical injury
or a mental disability as a result of the confinement, FECA is the exclu-
sive remedy,18 1 even though the Act does not compensate for mental
humiliation and dignitary harm."8 2 On the other hand, if a plaintiff has
sought relief solely for general emotional distress, the case may proceed
in tort.18
3
Michigan has a workers' compensation statute that is very similar to
FECA, but its courts have not followed the federal approach by looking
to the type of harm alleged in the complaint. 8 4 Instead, the Michigan
Court of Appeals has held that "the gist of an action for false imprison-
ment is unlawful detention irrespective of any physical or mental harm,"
and that an unlawful detention is not a compensable "personal
injury." s5 Consequently, a plaintiff may bring a tort action for false
imprisonment even if the confinement has resulted in "physical or mental
harm," which is covered by Michigan's workers' compensation legisla-
tion. That is, rather than looking at the entire range of alleged injuries,
the Michigan court of appeals focuses on the "gist of the plaintiff's cause
of action" in allowing an alternative tort action.186
New Zealand, of course, has solved the problem by adopting the
cumulative remedy theory."8 7 Rather than requiring an election between
workers' compensation benefits and tort damages, New Zealand allows
the plaintiff to split the cause of action for false imprisonment. 188 Physi-
cal and mental injuries caused by the confinement are compensable under
the Accident Compensation Act.'8 9 Nominal and compensatory dam-
ages for the dignitary harm are recoverable in tort. 9 ' If the plaintiff is
able to prove the requisite malice, punitive damages are available in tort
as well. 191
180. Luczyszyn v. General Serv. Admin., 569 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Dunn v. United
States, 516 F. Supp. 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
181. See Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399, 403 n.5 (D.C. 1978).
182. Luczyszyn v. General Serv. Admin., 569 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Dunn v. United
States, 516 F. Supp. 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
183. Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978).
184. Moore v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id.; accord Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Schutt v.
Lado, 360 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); see also Powers v. Middlesboro Hosp., 258 Ky. 20,
79 S.W.2d 391 (1935) (false imprisonment is a wrong that is separate and independent of industrial
injury).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 142-52.
188. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, 9 N.Z. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REP. 553 (1983);
Bullock, supra note 147, at 26.
189. Re Attorney General: Decision 1011, 9 N.Z. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REP. 553.
190. Id.
191. Id.; Love, supra note 17, at 235-44, 273-74.
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B. Defamation
Defamation is a false statement that harms the reputation of
another, deterring third persons from associating with the victim. 92
Traditionally, the common law has held any defendant who intentionally
publishes defamatory material to a strict liability standard. 193  The
United States Supreme Court has modified the common law standard,
however. It has recognized a constitutional privilege which requires
proof of fault and sometimes proof of actual injury when the action is
brought by a public official, public figure, or private individual, and the
defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern. 194 The Court
recently refused to extend this constitutional privilege to statements
regarding matters of private concern. 195
The cumulative action theory has never been invoked by a defamed
employee, probably because a common law defamation action requires
proof of neither specific intent to harm nor outrageous conduct. 196
Rather, the vast majority of defamation actions have been adjudicated
under the alternative action theory.' 97 Plaintiffs invoking this theory
rarely have sought to recover under the intentional tort exception to an
exclusive remedy clause, 198 presumably because defamation is not
regarded as an intentional tort. Instead, most alternative tort actions for
defamation have proceeded on the theory that the "gravamen of a defa-
mation action is injury to reputation."' 99 Reputation then has been char-
acterized as a "proprietary interest, ' '2"" which distinguishes it from the
"personal injury" that is covered by workers' compensation. 20 ' The
courts generally have followed Michigan's approach to false imprison-
ment litigation,202 holding that defamation actions may proceed in tort in
order to permit recovery for harm to reputation, even though the plain-
192. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 174, at 774.
193. Id. at 804.
194. Id. at 805-08.
195. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greemnoss Builders, 53 U.S.L.W. 4866 (U.S. June 26, 1985).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 23-46.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 198-207. See generally Castagnera-Cain, Defamation
and Invasion of Privacy Actions in Typical Employee Relations Situations, 13 LINCOLN L. REv. 1
(1982) (discussing employment references and statements to co-workers).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53, 82-92, 122-39. For defamation cases in which
the plaintiff was required to prove specific intent to defame in order to get around the exclusive
remedy clause of a workers' compensation statute, see Jackman v. Fisher, 91 A.D.2d 602, 456
N.Y.S.2d 429 (1982); Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1982).
199. Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286, 289 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982). Accord Dorr v. C.B.
Johnson, Inc., 660 P.2d 517 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass, 545, 551-52,
413 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1980).
200. Battista, 454 A.2d at 289; Foley, 381 Mass. at 551-52, 413 N.E.2d at 715.
201. Battista, 454 A.2d at 289. See supra text accompanying notes 98-118.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
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tiff's complaint also contains allegations of resulting physical or mental
injury.203
A Kentucky court2" has adopted a slightly different approach. It
justified an alternative tort action for slander per se by emphasizing that
the "crux of a slander per se action is not injury" because special dam-
ages do not have to be proven. 20 5 Therefore, it held, workers' compensa-
tion is not applicable.20 6 The precedent appears to draw a troubling
distinction between slander per se/libel per se (in which the plaintiff is
entitled to general damages) and slander/libel per quod (in which special
damages must be proven).207 Thus, by this court's reasoning, only in the
defamation per se actions would tort damages be recoverable.
A California court of appeal recently has recognized the cumulative
tort remedy approach in defamation litigation.208 In Howland v.
Balma,20 9 the plaintiff, who had already received a workers' compensa-
tion settlement for "industrial injuries" (including physical and mental
harm), also was allowed to bring a defamation action for "injury to repu-
tation" arising out of the same occurrence. 210 A distinct advantage of
the cumulative tort remedy is that it avoids the problematic distinction
between defamation per se and slander/libel per quod.211 Instead, work-
ers' compensation is available to cover special damages in any type of
defamation action, and courts still may impose tort liability for actual
harm to reputation, or for general and punitive damages whenever they
are constitutionally permissible.
C. Civil Rights and Privacy Violations
Employers are rarely engaged in sufficient state action to make them
liable for a violation of an employee's federal constitutional rights.212
However, they are usually subject to federal and state civil rights legisla-
tion prohibiting employment discrimination 213 and to the common law
doctrines governing invasions of privacy.21 4 Plaintiffs suing employers
203. E.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 551-52, 413 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1980); accord
Braman v. Walthall, 215 Ark. 582, 225 S.W.2d 342 (1949); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286
(Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio App. 2d 55, 351 N.E.2d 775 (1973).
See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1279, § 5 (1972).
204. Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
205. Id. at 279.
206. Id.
207. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 174, § 112.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 153-73.
209. 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983).
210. Id. at 905-06, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
211. See supra text accompanying note 207.
212. E.g., Hayes v. Johnson, 578 F. Supp. .685 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (state action by state prison
employer).
213. Eg., Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
214. E.g., Cole v. Dow Chem. Co., 315 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). See generally Note,
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for violations of civil rights usually need not prove intent.215 Instead, the
courts focus on whether the defendant has infringed a fundamental right
of the employee.216
Cumulative tort actions217 are available for civil rights violations
under the United States Constitution or federal statutory law.218 The
supremacy clause provides the justification for these cumulative
actions.219 The courts have held that an employer may not invoke a state
exclusive remedy clause to bar an action for a violation of federal law.221
For example, in Hayes v. Johnson,221 a teacher employed by a Michigan
state prison recovered workers' compensation benefits after she was
raped by an inmate. She then filed a section 1983 action against her
employer, alleging that the defendant's failure to provide her with ade-
quate protection had denied her equal protection because it "was moti-
vated in part by the defendant's animus against her as a woman. '222 The
employer asserted the exclusive remedy clause as an affirmative defense.
The court held that "once a cause of action for violation of a substantive
constitutional right has been stated, affirmative defenses created by state
law.. . will have no effect in barring or delimiting recovery. ' 223 The
plaintiff was therefore permitted to recover for "all her injuries... ,
including personal injuries, medical expenses and psychic damage. ' 224
Such cumulative actions for violations of constitutional rights also have
been justified as a matter of policy on the grounds that they provide the
maximum possible deterrent against violations of fundamental, federal
constitutional rights.225
When cases have been brought against private employers for violat-
Liability Waiting to Strike Violatian of an Employee's Privacy Through Disclosure of Records, 14
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 385 (1981); Note, Employee Medical Records and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1267 (1981).
215. See Walker v. Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See generally Gilden, The
Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immu-
nity and the Constitution, 11 HOFS'rA L. REv. 557 (1983); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens
Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 1110983).
216. Eg., Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 23-46.
218. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 85 (1983); Hayes
v. Johnson, 578 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Walker v. Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Hutchings v. Erie City & County Library Bd. of Directors, 516 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
219. Eg., Hayes v. Johnson, 578 F. Supp. 685, 689-90 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Accord Shell Oil Co.
v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 596, 2 P.2d 801 (1931).
220. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 85 (1983).
221. 578 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
222. Id. at 688.
223. Id. at 689.
224. Id. at 690.
225. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 85 (1983);
Walker v. Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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ing state civil rights legislation or for invasions of privacy,226 most juris-
dictions have applied the alternative action theory because the
supremacy clause does not mandate the use of the cumulative action the-
ory. Under the alternative action theory, courts have not required plain-
tiffs to fit their cases within the intentional tort exception to the exclusive
remedy clause.227 Instead, they have asked whether a discriminatory
injury is a "personal injury, ' 228 and, if so, whether it "arises out of the
scope of employment'
229
To determine whether a civil rights or privacy violation is a "per-
sonal injury" covered by workers' compensation, some courts look to the
various types of harm suffered by the plaintiff. They then apply a
"merger doctrine." Under this doctrine, if the plaintiff has sustained a
physical injury or a mental disability covered by workers' compensation,
the plaintiff is barred from bringing the civil rights or privacy action
because all of the harms are deemed to have merged together.2 30 For
example, because a worker who became sterile due to exposure to chemi-
cals had suffered physical injury, he was not allowed to bring a privacy
action for the denial of his fundamental right to procreate.2 31 And a
woman who suffered an acute nervous breakdown following a discrimi-
natory discharge was barred from recovering compensation for her gen-
eral emotional distress under the Michigan Fair Employment Practices
Act because her injury had culminated in a "disabling condition. ' 23 2 It
should be noted that in neither of the above cases did workers' compen-
sation legislation provide a remedy for the harm to the plaintiff's digni-
tary interest.23
3
The problem with the "merger doctrine" is that it gives a preference
to workers' compensation remedies when the plaintiff's injuries are cov-
ered by both workers' compensation and state civil rights legislation.234
To resolve this problem, other courts have given precedence to state civil
226. Eg., Cole v. Dow Chem. Co., 315 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (violation of privacy
interests).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53, 82-92.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 98-118.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 119-39. E.g., Williams v. United States, 565 F. Supp.
59 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
230. Williams v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Miss 1983); Cole v. Dow Chem. Co., 315
N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
231. Cole v. Dow Chem. Co., 315 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
232. Stimson v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). The Michigan
Supreme Court expressly disapproved the holding in StImson in Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.,
362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984).
233. Cole, 315 N.W.2d at 569; Stimson, 258 N.W.2d at 232.
234. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984). See Freeman v. Kel-
vinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (discussing in dictum the historical interpre-
tation of workers' compensation and merger principles).
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rights legislation.235 These courts have been influenced by the cases
which construe the supremacy clause as mandating a preference for fed-
eral constitutional rights over state no-fault legislation.2 36  They have
developed two theories: (1) a "discrimination injury is unique, '237 and
therefore not covered by workers' compensation; 238 and (2) a civil rights
injury does not arise out of employment because it is "not a hazard of
employment. ' 239 Under these decisions, courts have granted relief for
claims of sex discrimination, 2' race discrimination,24 1 and denial of pro-
cedural due process242 despite the defendants' invocation of an exclusive
remedy clause as an affirmative defense.
The problem with both of the above alternative action approaches is
that they force a choice between either workers' compensation benefits or
a civil rights remedy. Recent Michigan lower court decisions have found
a way to permit plaintiffs to take advantage of both types of remedial
laws-the cumulative remedy theory.243 Thus, in Pacheco v. Clifton,24
the court held that a plaintiff who had been the victim of national origin
discrimination could recover workers' compensation benefits for the
period of his'temporary physical disability as well as civil rights damages,
"particularly those resulting from humiliation, embarrassment,. . . and
lost wages."245 The court explicitly rejected the merger doctrine. It held
that the plaintiff could recover civil rights damages for "those injuries
occurring prior to plaintiff's disability" as well as for "those occurring
after his disability."246
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Pacheco v.
235. E-g., Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 218-25.
237. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
238. DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983); Moll v. Parkside Livonia
Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999
(E.D. Mich. 1979). See also Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 470 Ohio App. 2d 55, 351 N.E.2d 775
(1973).
239. Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 553, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980).
240. Moll v. Parkside Livonia Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
241. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
242. Grichenko v. United States Postal Serv., 524 F. Supp. 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 751 F.2d
368 (2d Cir. 1984).
243. Borchardt-Spicer v. G.A.F. Corp., 362 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); McCalla v.
Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Pacheco v. Clifton, 311 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), atd, Boscaglia
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984). For a discussion of McCalla and Slayton,
see supra text accompanying notes 166-73.
244. 311 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), affd, Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362
N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984).
245. Id. at 806.
246. Id.
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Clifton,247 but it adopted the cumulative action theory rather than the
cumulative remedy theory. The court ruled than an employee invoking
an express or implied state statutory right to be protected against employ-
ment discrimination is exempt from the workers' compensation exclusiv-
ity provision."' The court emphasized that the state civil rights acts are
aimed at different evils from those at which the workers' compensation
act is directed.249 The workers' compensation act "guards against the
victims of industrial injuries being 'turned away empty handed'. . . as a
result of common-law tort doctrines such as contributory negligence and
the fellow-servant rule."25° The civil rights acts, by contrast, are
"addressed to the 'prejudices and biases' one race, sex or religion bears
against another."2 The court concluded that the legislature did not
intend for the objectives of the civil rights acts to be "defeated by the bar
of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act. 252
Rather, the legislature intended for the civil rights legislation to "super-
sede or modify" the scope of the workers' compensation legislation.253
Thus, the court invoked the general principle that specific legislation
supersedes or modifies general legislation. Just as all courts have adopted
the cumulative action theory to protect federal rights, so the Michigan
Supreme Court has now adopted the theory to protect statutory state civil
rights.
The two opinions in Pacheco v. Cilfton invite a comparison of the
cumulative action and cumulative remedy theories in the context of state
civil rights litigation. The cumulative action theory allows the state civil
rights plaintiff to file first for workers' compensation benefits, and then to
sue for civil rights damages. In the event of double recovery, the work-
ers' compensation benefits are set off against the civil rights damages.
The advantage of this procedure is that it provides maximum compensa-
tion for the victim of a civil rights violation. In addition, the civil rights
action thereby has its maximum deterrent impact against the employer.
The cumulative remedy theory, like the cumulative action theory, per-
mits the employee to recover civil rights damages without foregoing any
applicable workers' compensation benefits. Unlike the cumulative action
theory, however, the cumulative remedy theory preserves the limitation
on an employer's liability for physical or mental disabilities, which is a
central feature of workers' compensation legislation. Under the cumula-
247. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984), ajfg Pacheco v. Clif-
ton, 336 N.W.2d 849 (1980) (Pacheco was consolidated with Boscaglia).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 645.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 646.
253. Id.
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tive remedy theory, the employer is subjected to open-ended liability only
for the dignitary and punitive damages flowing directly from the civil
rights violation. Thus, the cumulative remedy theory attempts to recon-
cile the conflict between state civil rights legislation and the exclusive
remedy clause, whereas the cumulative action theory gives priority to the
state civil rights legislation.
D. Offensive Battery, Assault, and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
Offensive battery and assault are torts commited with the intent to
cause offensive contact or the apprehension of either harmful or offensive
contact.25 4 An action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires proof that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct with the intent to cause severe emotional distress.25 5 Only twice
has the cumulative action theory256 been applied to any of these three
causes of action.25 7 Most complaints alleging one of these three causes of
action have been examined under the alternative action theory.258
Claims for assault, offensive battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress present thorny problems in drawing a line between
tort liability and no-fault benefits because they are frequently brought for
a mixture of physical and nonphysical harm.25 9 When actions for false
imprisonment, defamation, and civil rights violations are brought for
both physical and nonphysical harm, most courts are willing to look to
the "gist of the claim" and permit a plaintiff to proceed in tort to vindi-
cate the dignitary interest.2 ° But in actions for assault, offensive battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the essence of the claim is
mental harm, rather than a specific dignitary interest.26' For this reason,
the courts have tended to hold that these are claims for "personal injury"
covered by workers' compensation. The tendency is particularly pro-
254. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 174, §§ 9-10.
255. Id. § 12, at 60. See generally Givelben, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 42 (1982).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 23-46.
257. Young v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); McGee v.
McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981); see also supra text accompanying notes
41-42.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 68-139.
259. Eg., Vigil v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983); Stewart v.
McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86, 202-03, 234-42.
261. See Kissinger v. Mannor, 285 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). Battery and assault are
better suited than intentional infliction of emotional distress to protecting dignitary interests, because
nominal damages are recoverable in battery and assault actions. Eg., Brown v. Stauffer Chem. Co.,
167 Mont. 418, 539 P.2d 374 (1975).
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nounced if the complaint alleges physical injury2 6 2 or if the jurisdiction
allows no-fault benefits for mental harm caused by a mental or physical
stimulus.
263
Professor Larson has suggested the following solution to the
dilemma presented by nonphysical intentional tort actions for mixed
types of harm under the alternative action theory:
If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are of
the usual non-physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to
the list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if
the essence of the action is recovery for physical injury or death, the
action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form of a normally
non-physical tort.2 4
Professor Larson's solution is not particularly satisfactory because it con-
ditions the opportunity to bring an alternative action upon the absence of
physical injury. The more physical the harm, the less likely that the
plaintiff will be allowed to proceed in tort.2 65 Yet it is precisely in cases
of egregious misconduct resulting in physical as well as nonphysical
harm that tort damages seem most appropriate to vindicate the victim
and to punish the perpetrator.
There are several potential solutions that would be preferable to
Professor Larson's. First, because assault, offensive battery, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress are all intentional tort actions, a
court could permit a plaintiff to bring an alternative action based upon
proof of intent.266 Second, if the legislature's general policy were to
262. Burbank v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1979), afl'd, 616 F.2d
565 (5th Cir. 1980); Hollywood Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 754, 210
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1985); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979);
Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979); Kandt v.
Evans, 645 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1982); Ellis v. Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 166,
602 P.2d 895 (1979).
263. See Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984); Foley v. Polaroid Corp.,
381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980); cf Burbank v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 693
(N.D. Ga. 1979), af'd, 616 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980).
264. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.34(a) (1983).
265. The Michigan Supreme Court has voiced a comparable criticism of Professor Larson's
theory as applied to civil rights actions in Stimson v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1977):
The Stimson distinction [between "disabling conditions" and "nondisabling discrimi-
natory injuries"] would yield anomalous results. Where employment discrimination causes
injuries that are not so severe as to culminate in disability, the injured employee would be
permitted to sue his employer in tort and recover full damages; however, where the injuries
suffered are so severe as to culminate in disability, the injured employee would be restricted
to workers' compensation benefits.
Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co, 362 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Mich. 1984).
266. Eg., Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 427 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316 (1961); Maggio v. St. Francis Medical
Center, 391 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert denied, 396 So.2d 1351 (La. 1981); Schutt v. Lado,
360 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Leopold v. Britt, 58 A.D.2d 856, 396 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1977).
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allow no-fault benefits for intentional torts, an alternative action could be
recognized whenever the defendant's conduct was so egregious that the
injury "did not arise out of the scope of the employment, 2 67 as in cases
of sexual harassment. 6 8 Third, a court that focused exclusively on the
type of harm sustained could distinguish between "mental disability" and
"general emotional distress." Workers' compensation would cover cases
of "physical or mental disability," while suits for "general emotional dis-
tress" would be actionable in tort.2 69 Finally, a court could invoke the
cumulative remedy theory.270 Under it, workers' compensation benefits
would be available for physical and mental disabilities. At the same
time, a plaintiff could pursue a tort action for either nominal damages or
general emotional distress damages, plus punitive damages whenever the
requisite malice could be shown.
E. Bad-Faith Refusal to Pay or Delay in Paying Workers'
Compensation Claim
An offshoot of the action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is an action against a liability or loss insurer for bad faith in process-
ing an insurance claim.2 7 1 Specifically, in the workers' compensation
context, an employee may bring an action against a workers' compensa-
tion insurer (or an employer) for a refusal to pay workers' compensation
benefits, a delay in payment, a fraudulent investigation, or a wrongful
termination of benefits designed to coerce a settlement.272 A bad-faith
action may be based upon proof of negligence,273 fraud274 or intent.275
The first case to recognize a bad faith action against a workers' com-
pensation carrier was Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange.276 Despite
These cases adopt the approach to recognizing an alternative tort action that is discussed in text
accompanying notes 82-92 supra.
267. Eg., Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983); Lagies
v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980). These cases adopt the approach to
recognizing an alternative tort action that is discussed in text accompanying notes 119-39 supra.
268. E.g., Bennet v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887 (D. Colo. 1982); Skousen v. Nidy,
90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961).
269. Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Ritter v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1360 (D.S.C. 1968), afid, 407 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1969); Renteria v.
County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978); Kissinger v. Mannor, 285
N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). These cases adopt the approach to recognizing an alternative
tort action that is discussed in text accompnaying notes 112-14 supra.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 140-73.
271. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 902 (1981); Schuesslcr, First Party Bad Faith: ShouldIt
Be Extended to Workers' Compensation Cases? 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 199 (1984).
272. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 68.34(b)-(c) (1983).
273. E.g., Savio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
274. E.g., DeMarco v. Federal Ins. Co., 99 A.D.2d 114, 472 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
275. E.g., Gibson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 454 So. 2d 526 (Ala. 1984); Garvin v. Shewbart, 442
So. 2d 80 (Ala. 1983).
276. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
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an exclusive remedy clause protecting insurers, the California Supreme
Court permitted the plaintiff to bring a cumulative action against a car-
rier who conducted a fraudulent investigation of the employee's no-fault
claim. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to recover tort damages in addi-
tion to the workers' compensation benefits that she had already received
for both the original industrial injury and the mental breakdown result-
ing from the fraudulent investigation. To avoid double recovery, the
court required that the no-fault benefits awarded for her breakdown be
set off against the bad-faith tort damages.
The Unruh court distinguished between "negligent" and "inten-
tional" misconduct, stating that only proof of intent would justify a
cumulative tort action.277 The highest courts of Alaska278 and Maine279
have followed Unruh, recognizing a cumulative action for an insurer's
intentional misconduct. Subsequent cases from California280 and other
jurisdictions281 have interpreted Unruh more restrictively, however,
requiring proof of "fraudulent, deceitful, outrageous [or] perfidious" tor-
tious acts by the insurer.282 The California Supreme Court was recently
deprived of an opportunity to resolve this dispute over the requisite state
of mind when the parties in Palmer v. R.L. Kautz & Co. settled the case
while the appeal was pending.28 3
Although the cumulative action theory was the original theory of
recovery in the bad-faith cases, the majority of jurisdictions now apply
the alternative action theory. It is therefore important to examine the
workers' compensation remedies for bad-faith conduct by insurers. Most
legislatures have enacted workers' compensation provisions designed to
encourage good-faith conduct by insurers.284 Several jurisdictions have
an explicit statutory procedure whereby an employee may coerce compli-
277. Id. at 630, 498 P.2d at 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
278. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974).
279. Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1978).
280. Goetz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1983); Argonaut Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 320, 324, 210 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1985); Gallo Glass Co. v.
Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 485, 488, 196 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1983); Cervantes v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 763, 768, 189 Cal. Rptr. 761, 764 (1983); Droz v. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co.,
138 Cal. App. 3d 181, 184-85, 188 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1982); Depew v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
135 Cal. App. 3d 574, 576-77, 185 Cal. Rptr. 472, 473-74 (1982); Fremont Indem. Co. v. Superior
Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 879, 184 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1982); Ricard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 132 Cal. App.
3d 886, 893, 183 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (1982); Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 15, 18, 171 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165 (1981).
281. E.g., Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 117 Ariz.
209, 571 P.2d 706 (1977); Denisen v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
282. Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15, 19, 171 Cal. Rptr. 164,
165 (1981).
283. Palmer v. R.L. Kautz & Co., 190 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1983) (hearing granted; appeal dismissed
due to settlement).
284. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 902, § 5 (1981).
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ance with the rules governing payment of workers' compensation bene-
fits.285 An increasing number of jurisdictions also have enacted a
statutory penalty for inexcusable delay in processing workers' compensa-
tion claims.2 6 Courts in these states frequently have held these remedies
to be exclusive, barring tort actions for both negligent and intentional
misconduct by the insurer.287 They have distinguished the harm caused
by the insurer's bad faith from the industrial injury. These courts have
concluded that the exceptions to the exclusive remedy clause apply only
when the employee is suing the employer for the industrial injury. Thus,
these courts have refused to authorize a bad-faith tort action (1) under a
workers' compensation provision recognizing an intentional tort excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy clause governing industrial injuries,"' or (2)
as an action outside the scope of an exclusive remedy clause that covers
only "accidental injuries" or injuries "arising out of" the employment
relationship.289
Other courts faced with a statutory coercive remedy or penalty pro-
vision have adopted a completely contrary approach. They have permit-
ted an employee to elect between a workers' compensation remedy and
tort damages for the insurer's failure to process a claim promptly. 90 In
justifying the alternative action theory, they have invoked the traditional
exceptions to the exclusive remedy clause. 291 Recognizing that the type
of harm sustained is covered by a coercive remedy or statutory penalty,
these courts have held that the statutory remedy is not exclusive because.
285. For example, New Mexico law allows for an expedited hearing and judgment by a district
court when the employee files a claim to collect for nonpayment. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-31 to
-39 (1978 & Supp. 1984); see also Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1977)
(New Mexico law); Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982).
286. !Eg., CAL LAB. CODE §§ 5814, 5814.1, 5814.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985); see also
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983).
287. Escobedo v. American Employers Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1977) (New Mexico
law); Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1977) (New Mexico law); Whitten
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1977), affid, 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir.
1979); Strickland v. Birmingham Bldg. & Remodeling, 449 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. 1984); Brown v. Trans-
portation Ins. Co, 448 So. 2d 348 (Ala. 1984); Waldon v. Hartford Ins. Group, 435 So. 2d 1271 (Ala.
1983); Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 117 Ariz. 209, 571
P.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1977); Hixon v. State Compensation Fund, 115 Ariz. 392, 565 P.2d 898 (Ct.
App. 1977); Garrett v. Washington Air Compressor Co., 466 A.2d 462 (D.C. 1983); Old Republic
Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378,
320 S.E.2d 365 (1984); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983);
Taylor v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 420 So. 2d 564 (Miss. 1982); Young v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., 588 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 98
N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1982); Gonzales v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 99 N.M. 432,
659 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1983).
288. Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1261 n.4 (8th Cir. 1983) (South Dakota
law).
289. Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983).
290. Savio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 76-139.
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the defendant's act was "intentional"2 92 or "callous., 293 They have rea-
soned that "[i]t was never intended that injuries thus caused were to be
exclusively the province of the Workers' Compensation Board." '29 4
In recent years, an increasing number of jurisdictions have refused
to require an election between a workers' compensation remedy and tort
damages for acts of bad faith. Instead, they have applied the cumulative
remedy theory. 2 " Specifically, in addition to relief under the coercive
remedy or statutory penalty provisions, they have permitted the
employee to proceed in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.296 Some courts have emphasized the nonphysical nature of the
emotional distress damages, 297 noting that they are not compensable
under workers' compensation:
The essence of the tort alleged, and the damage alleged, is nonphysical.
This is not an action for mental damages incidentally resulting from an
industrial injury. Were we to hold otherwise, employers and insurance
companies could, with impunity, withhold benefits for undeniably com-
pensable injuries until ordered to pay benefits by the Workers' Compen-
sation referee or Appeal Board. . . . We do not find such a result to
comport either with the intent of the Act or with the public interest. 298
Other courts have focused on the intentional or outrageous quality of the
defendant's conduct. 299 They have permitted the employee to recover
both the statutory penalty and tort damages because "the [penalty provi-
sion] does not contemplate that the intentional tort of bad faith can be
expiated merely by payments augmented in the amount of 10
percent. , 300
The cumulative remedy theory is particularly appropriate for bad-
faith litigation. It recognizes workers' compensation as the primary rem-
292. DeMarco v. Federal Ins. Co., 99 A.D.2d 114, 472 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
293. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1974) (Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act).
294. DeMarco v. Federal Ins. Co., 99 A.D.2d 114, 117, 472 N.Y.S.2d 464, 466 (1984).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 140-73.
296. E.g., Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80 (Ala. 1983); Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 64
N.Y.2d 412, 472 N.E.2d 682, 482 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1984).
297. Broaddus v. Ferndale Fastener Div., 269 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
298. Id. at 693.
299. Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983) (South Dakota law); Reed
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So.
2d 80 (Ala. 1983); Birkenbuel v. Montana State Compensation Ins. Fund, 687 P.2d 700 (Mont.
1984); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 187 Mont. 148, 609 P.2d 257 (1980); Massey v. Armco
Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983).
300. Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 625, 273 N.W.2d 220, 224
(1979). The Wisconsin legislature subsequently enacted a stiffer penalty provision. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.18(a) (bp) (West Supp. 1984). It is now the exclusive remedy for a bad-faith denial of workers'
compensation. Messner v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 120 Wis. 2d 127, 353 N.W.2d 363 (Ct. App.
1984).
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edy, thereby encouraging the legislature to enact a statutory penalty for
inexcusable delay in processing an employee's claim for the original
industrial injury. If the legislature fails to enact a statutory penalty, the
tort remedy is available as a deterrent to acts of bad faith by the compen-
sation carrier. If a penalty is enacted, but proves to be ineffective against
a recalcitrant insurer, the tort remedy may be invoked to punish espe-
cially egregious misconduct.
In bad-faith actions, the cumulative remedy is also easier to admin-
ister than the cumulative action theory. The cumulative action theory
requires the court to determine what percentage of workers' compensa-
tion benefits were awarded for the aggravation of the industrial injury by
the insurer's acts of bad faith, and to set off that percentage against the
tort damages. 30 1 Furthermore, the court must decide whether to offset
any statutory penalty against the tort recovery. Under the cumulative
remedy theory, by contrast, workers' compensation benefits are awarded
solely for the original industrial injury, and not for the insurer's acts of
bad faith.30 2 If there is a workers' compensation penalty, it is not set off
against the tort recovery because the penalty is regarded as an adminis-
trative fine rather than as compensatory or punitive damages.
III
LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
This Article has analyzed various options for preserving tort liability
for nonphysical harm. A legislature could adopt any one of them. It
could authorize a cumulative action, an alternative action, or a cumula-
tive remedy. Nor is it necessary for a legislature to select a single
approach to preserving tort liability for all nonphysical harms. It may
adopt different options for different causes of action. The choice will
depend not only upon considerations of administrative efficiency, but
also upon the value that the legislature attributes to the interests pro-
tected by the various tort actions for nonphysical harm. This Section of
the Article will evaluate the different options and will highlight the fac-
tors that the legislature should consider in choosing among them.
A. Cumulative Action
The cumulative action has the maximum compensatory, deterrent,
and punitive impact. The plaintiff is permitted to obtain a tort judgment
for full compensatory damages plus punitive damages (if they are appro-
priate), with a set-off for no-fault benefits. The cumulative action is also
301. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 636, 498 P.2d 1063, 1077-78, 102 Cal. Rptr.
815, 829, (1972).
302. Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 624, 273 N.W.2d 220, 223
(1979).
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generally the easiest to administer because the injured person may pro-
cess claims for no-fault benefits and tort damages simultaneously. Fur-
thermore, the legislature need not draw a line between the spheres of no-
fault coverage and tort liability. The cumulative action theory conflicts,
however, with the no-fault objective of limiting a defendant's tort liability
for compensatory damages. Therefore, the theory should be recognized
only to protect highly valued interests or to punish and deter serious
misconduct.
The cumulative action was first recognized for deliberately inflicted
physical injury and outrageous conduct designed to cause severe emo-
tional distress. It can be tailored to other types of fact situations, as evi-
denced by the cases authorizing cumulative civil rights actions. A
legislature wishing to exercise this option should focus on three issues.
First, it must define the nature of the interest to be protected by the
cumulative action. The no-fault legislation could permit tort liability
only for specific interests, such as constitutional rights, or, more gener-
ally, for all types of nonphysical harm. The second issue is the nature of
the defendant's conduct. Due to the historical origins of the cumulative
action theory, it is associated with proof of specific intent to injure or of
egregious misconduct. A cumulative action also could be premised upon
ordinary proof of intent or recklessness, however, and there is no need to
impose a requirement of outrageous conduct outside the context of an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The third issue is
the relationship between the tort action and any statutory penalty that
the state may have adopted as part of its no-fault plan. The legislature
should specify whether the injured person is entitled to both the statutory
penalty and tort damages, or whether the penalty is to be set off against
the tort recovery.
B. Alternative Action
The authorization of a cumulative action can be criticized as too
generous, and it certainly conflicts with the no-fault objective of limiting
a defendant's tort liability for compensatory damages. The alternative
action represents a more conservative approach, under which the defend-
ant is subjected to tort liability only when no-fault benefits are not avail-
able. The alternative action is the most widely used theory in claims for
nonphysical harm.
Because the alternative action theory requires a choice between tort
liability and no-fault coverage, a legislature adopting the theory must
carefully distinguish between them. One approach is to draw the line by
reference to the type of interest to be protected. A legislature drawing
this sort of line could authorize tort actions for all types of nonphysical
harm. Alternatively, it could create tort liability for specific causes of
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action, such as defamation, false imprisonment, and civil rights viola-
tions. It should be noted that it is easier to draw the line with reference
to actions for dignitary harm than for emotional distress. In the former,
the legislature can focus on the essence of the tort (e.g., harm to reputa-
tion), while in the latter, it must distinguish between general emotional
distress, which is actionable in tort, and mental or physical disability,
which is compensable under the no-fault plan.
Because it is so difficult to draw the line between tort and no-fault
on the basis of the type of interest to be protected, the legislature may
prefer to focus on the nature of the defendant's conduct, requiring proof
of intent or recklessness. The problem with this approach is that some
tort actions for nonphysical harm, such as defamation and constitutional
tort actions, do not require proof of intent as part of the prima facie case.
To encompass these actions, the legislature could impose tort liability for
any misconduct that does not arise out of, and in the course of, employ-
ment. This method of demarcating the boundary between tort and no-
fault encourages the decisionmaker to take into account the policy con-
siderations underlying the no-fault plan.
C. Cumulative Remedy
The primary problem with the alternative action theory is that it
mandates a choice between tort and no-fault. A plaintiff who wishes to
vindicate dignitary interests or punish the defendant through punitive
damages must forego no-fault benefits as compensation for actual harm.
The cumulative remedy theory resolves this dilemma. It allows the no-
fault plan to perform the compensatory function which it was designed
to serve, and authorizes the tort system to vindicate dignitary interests
and punish egregious misconduct. Instead of forcing a choice between
tort and no-fault, the cumulative remedy permits the claimant to recover
no-fault benefits for those harms covered by the plan, and tort damages
for those harms which fall outside the scope of the plan. Also, the cumu-
lative remedy theory encourages the establishment of no-fault penalties.
The no-fault penalty can be viewed as an administrative fine, with puni-
tive damages available as a backup in cases of the most egregious
conduct.
In drafting cumulative remedy legislation, it is necessary to define
the line between tort liability and no-fault coverage because all harms not
covered by the no-fault plan will be actionable in tort. The initial line
must be drawn by reference to the type of interest to be protected, even
though the preceding discussion of the alternative action theory has
emphasized that such a line is sometimes difficult to draw. Thus, the no-
fault plan could cover only physical disability, or it could cover both
physical and mental disabilities. If it covers mental disabilities, the legis-
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lature should specify the circumstances under which tort actions for non-
physical harm are appropriate. There are several options. First, the
legislature could decide to permit tort actions only for nominal plus puni-
tive damages. No-fault benefits would be the exclusive source of com-
pensation for nonphysical harm. Second, the legislature could authorize
tort actions for nominal and punitive damages plus compensatory dam-
ages to cover dignitary interests (e.g., harm to reputation) and general
emotional distress. Third, the legislature could authorize tort actions for
nonphysical harm only upon proof of intent or recklessness.
Once the legislature has determined which harms are covered by the
no-fault plan and which harms are compensable in tort, then it should
address tort liability for punitive damages. If it makes the no-fault plan
the sole source of compensation, the legislature should consider authoriz-
ing the recovery of punitive damages in tort upon proof of either nominal
damages or actual harm (even though the harm is compensated by the
no-fault plan).30 3 And if the no-fault plan contains statutory penalties, 3°4
the legislature should specify whether punitive damages are available in
addition to the no-fault penalties, or whether the statutory penalty is the
exclusive punitive remedy.
CONCLUSION
Of the three theories which currently authorize a tort action for
nonphysical harm after the adoption of a no-fault compensation plan, the
cumulative remedy theory best serves the objectives of both the tort and
no-fault systems. It retains the limitations on liability that are an essen-
tial part of any no-fault plan. Yet it also permits the imposition of tort
liability on defendants who would otherwise enjoy immunity under the
no-fault plan's exclusive remedy provision. Thus, it maximizes the use of
no-fault legislation to compensate for physical and mental disabilities.
At the same time, it preserves the traditional vindicatory and punitive
functions of tort liability.
303. See generally Love, supra note 17, at 244-51.
304. Id. at 251-52.
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